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Abstract
What explains the strong comovement between house prices and job
losses over the UK business cycle? To study this question, I build a general
equilibrium model with collateral constraints, endogenous job separation
and housing shocks, and confront it with macroeconomic data via Bayesian
methods. The results suggest that shocks to house prices (i) explain about
10-20% of output fluctuations and about 20-30% of fluctuations in unem-
ployment and job separation rates via the collateral channel, and (ii) were
a major cause in triggering the 1990 and 2008 recessions in the UK.
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1 Introduction
The Great Recession has drawn increasing attention to the relationship between
house prices, labour markets and the business cycle.1 Motivated by recent ex-
perience, the present paper aims to provide a structural analysis of the dynamic
links between real estate prices, corporate credit and labour markets in the UK.
The proposed mechanism that can explain these dynamic links is the one re-
lated to the collateral channel: adverse movements in real estate prices reduce
the borrowing capacity of firms resulting in an increase in job destruction and a
decrease in job creation, leading to higher levels of unemployment rates and to
potential shifts in the Beveridge curve.2
The strong negative relationship between house prices and the unemployment
rate is a feature not only of the recent crisis, but characterises historical UK
business cycles as well.3 I document that house prices co-move at least as strongly
with job separation rates as with job finding rates. Figure 1 shows that the
cyclical components of real house prices and separation rates have about -80%
correlation in the sample 1985Q1-2013Q2. This may question the suitability
of theoretical models, such as Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Liu, Miao, and
Zha (2013) amongst others, that assume constant separation rates and focus on
fluctuations in job finding rates in order to explain unemployment dynamics.4
To explain the stylised facts, this paper develops a structural model whereby
shocks that increase house prices, also raise the market value of collateralisable
assets that firms own, thereby increasing their borrowing capacity, leading to
an expansion of corporate credit, business investment and a reduction in job
separation rates. Regarding the implications for the UK business cycle, the model
1Figure 12 of the Appendix plots some of the key macroeconomic time series since 2007.
2A formal microeconometric study by Bahaj, Foulis, and Pinter (2015) shows that over
2000-2012 a £100,000 increase in real estate values enabled the representative UK firm to
increase investment by about £6,000 pounds and to hire one additional worker. Studies for
the US have found similar effects of property prices on investment and entrepreneurship via
the collateral channel (Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2012; Corradin and Popov, 2015).
3This is illustrated by Figure 13 of the Appendix which shows that the HP-filtered real
house prices and the unemployment rate have a −72% correlation during the 1972Q1-2013Q3
period. Figure 14 shows the relationship in levels. Figure 15 shows the comovement between
house prices and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, and Figure 16 shows the relationship with
job finding rates.
4This is partly explained by the evidence for the US where job separation has found by Hall
(2005) and Shimer (2012) to be acyclical. These findings have subsequently been challenged by
Solon, Michaels, and Elsby (2009) and Fujita and Ramey (2009). The international evidence
is also mixed (Hobijn and Sahin, 2009).
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Figure 1: HP-filtered UK House Prices and Separation Rates
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Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008). The updated data runs from 1985Q1 to 2013Q2. The logarithm of both
series are HP-filtered with λ = 1600.
implies that house price shocks (unanticipated movements in house prices, not
caused by innovations in technology or labour markets) (i) explain about 10-20%
of output fluctuations and about 20-30% of fluctuations in unemployment and
job separation rates via the collateral channel over the forecast horizon, and (ii)
were a major cause in triggering the 1990 and 2008 recessions in the UK.
The theoretical part of the paper builds on two strands of literature. First, it
draws on the vast literature studying the interactions between financial markets
and the macroeconomy such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) amongst many others including the studies
focusing on the UK such as Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe (2004) and Campbell
and Cocco (2007). Second, it builds on the literature of search and matching
models in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) with an explicit focus
on the link between labour markets and financial frictions including Monacelli,
Quadrini, and Trigari (2011), Veracierto, Fisher, and Davis (2012), Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2013), Liu, Miao, and Zha (2013), Ravn and Sterk
(2014), Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2015).
The present paper is closest to Liu, Miao, and Zha (2013) that estimates
a model with exogenous job separation and shows that shocks to real estate
prices can generate substantial volatility in labour market variables in the US
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via the collateral channel (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).5 However, the theoretical
assumption of constant separation rates is in stark contrast with the large em-
pirical contribution of the unemployment inflow rate to the dynamics of the UK
unemployment rate. Table 1 shows the decomposition, used by Fujita and Ramey
(2009), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) and Smith (2011) amongst others, con-
firming the increased role of separation rates during UK recessions. Relative to
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008), the additional result is that more than half
of unemployment volatility is explained by the inflow rate during and after the
Great Recession.
Table 1: Contributions from the Inflow Rate to Unemployment Volatility, UK
Claimant Count
Period Feature βs
1985Q1-2006Q4 Pre- Great Recession 0.385
1993Q1-2006Q4 Falling u 0.265
1985Q1-2014Q2 Whole sample 0.422
2007Q1-2014Q2 Great Recession 0.584
Notes: βs is calculated as the ratio of the covariance between the contribution of the inflow rate and the change
in steady-state unemployment to the variance of the change in steady-state unemployment. The calculation
follows Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) and Fujita and Ramey (2009).
Motivated by the strong cyclical comovement between house prices and job
separation in the UK (Figure 1) and the decomposition of Table 1, I extend
the baseline financing frictions model by introducing endogenous job separation
along the lines of Ramey, den Haan, and Watson (2000), Krause and Lubik
(2007), Trigari (2009) and Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011). This
theoretical extension is important for understanding not only the UK business
cycle, but may help better quantify the causes of the Great Recession in the US
as well. This is because the results of Liu, Miao, and Zha (2013) suggest that
a shock that reduces real estate prices by 10% increases the unemployment rate
by 0.34% points in the US. Given that the US unemployment rate increased by
5In a similar framework, but without financial frictions, Liu and Leduc (2013) studies the
macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks on labour markets. They too assume exogenous
job separation, and therefore focus on responses of equilibrium vacancy and unemployment
caused by a movement along the downward-sloping Beveridge curve. In their conclusion,
they specifically call for an extension with endogenous separation: “A more realistic model
should incorporate endogenous job separation along the lines of Ramey, den Haan, and Watson
(2000) and Walsh (2005), which is likely to further strengthen the aggregate demand effects
of uncertainty shocks that we have studied in this paper. This should prove a fruitful avenue
that we intend to pursue in future research.”
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about 5% points in 2008-2009, and that US separation rates spiked rapidly, the
model of Liu, Miao, and Zha (2013) may substantially underestimate the impact
of house prices shocks because of not accounting for endogenous job separation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
provides some preliminary empirical evidence on the impact of house price shocks
on labour market variables. Section 3 describes the theoretical model. Section 4
presents the results of the Bayesian estimation of the theoretical model. Section
5 discusses the policy implications and concludes.
2 Data and Some Empirical Evidence
This section provides some preliminary empirical evidence on the impact of house
price shocks on macroeconomic and labour market variables. The main text
will present the empirical results from an aggregate Bayesian VAR model. The
implied structural housing shocks series and forecast error decompositions will
subsequently be compared to those implied by the estimated DSGE model in
Section 4. In addition, section C of the Appendix present empirical results from
a regional static panel model.
To construct job finding and job separation rates, I use administrative data on
workers joining or leaving the unemployment register during a period. The data,
often referred to as the claimant count, cover workers who claim unemployment
compensation or who are registered at government agencies. Quarterly aver-
ages of monthly, seasonally adjusted series for unemployment and new claims
are used. Aggregate UK data covering the period 1983Q3-2007Q2 are taken di-
rectly from Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008), and are extended for the period
2007Q3-2014Q2. Claimant count data for the English regions are taken from
ONS covering the period 1983Q3-2014Q2. Aggregate and regional house price
data at quarterly frequency are taken from Nationwide for the period 1974Q1-
2014Q4. The rest of the data on aggregate variables including consumption,
output, house price index, consumer price index, population, credit and unem-
ployment rate are from the ONS and Bank of England database. Details can be
found in Section A of the Appendix.
A detailed description of the regional data are provided in sections C. More-
over, Figures 18–20 in Section B of the Appendix provide some descriptive analy-
sis in the form of scatter plots on the comovements between regional house price
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growth rates and growth rates of various economic and labour market variables.
Specifically, Figure 18 confirms the positive statistical relationship between house
prices and economic activity, proxied by the growth rate of output in the con-
struction sector, new mortgage lending, number of new VAT registrations, num-
ber of new immigrants, investment (gross fixed capital formation) and average
weekly income. Figure 19 confirms the positive (negative) relationship between
house price growth and the growth rate of the unemployment rate, number of
new claimants and job separation rates (job finding rates). Figure 20 shows that
strong positive relationship between house price growth and changes in regula-
tory constraints on housing supply captured by the rejection rates of planning
applications for all new developments.
To provide empirical evidence on the aggregate effects of house prices shocks,
Figure 2 plots the impulse responses of house prices, consumption, output, labour
hours, the unemployment rate, the level of corporate debt, household debt, job
finding rates and separation rates. These impulse responses are estimated from
an nine-variable Bayesian vectorautoregression (BVAR) model with two lags cov-
ering the sample period 1985Q1-2012Q4.6 Following the recent literature (Liu,
Wang, and Zha, 2013; Sterk, 2015), Choleski orthogonalisation is used to identify
housing shocks.
A positive shock that instantaneously increases house prices by 1% leads to an
economic expansion over the forecast horizon, with the impact on real output,
investment and hours peaking after about one year. The peak effect on the
unemployment rate is 0.08% points, whereas the impact on separation rates is as
strong as on job finding rates. Regarding the credit variables, the median peak
impact occurring after about 10 quarters is about twice as high for corporate
debt (1%) than for household debt (0.5%).7
To provide further empirical evidence, Section C of the Appendix presents
microeconomic estimates obtained from a regional-panel model, whereby rejec-
tion rates of planning applications are used to find exogenous variation in house
prices.8 The empirical estimates are in line with the macroeconometric evidence
6See Banbura, Giannone, and Reichlin (2010) for further details on the estimation method-
ology. I use relatively loose priors, captured by the hyperparameter λ = 1 in their notation.
7The results are qualitatively robust to changes in lag length. However, reducing (increas-
ing) the number of lags reduces (increases) the persistence and hump-shaped effects of house
price shocks. These results are available upon request.
8A more rigorous microeconomic identification based on difference-in-differences is provided
by the firm-level study of a companion paper by Bahaj, Foulis, and Pinter (2015).
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Figure 2: The Effects of a House Price Shock in the UK
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Note: The identification is with Choleski ordering. The sample period is 1985Q1 - 2012Q4. Each plot shows
the pointwise median, 32nd-68th and 5th-95th percentiles of the posterior.
presented in this section.
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that a shock to house prices leads to
a strong comovement between house prices, labour markets and other macroe-
conomic variables in the UK. These findings are quantitatively similar to those
found by Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) and Liu, Miao, and Zha (2013) for the US.
However, an additional feature of my empirical model is the impact on job sepa-
ration that has been ignored by previous papers, partly because of the increased
focus of US studies on job finding rates. The purpose of the theoretical model
presented in the next Section is to provide a structural interpretation of these
results.
3 The Theoretical Model
The model is infinite horizon and is in discrete time. The economy features
three agents: households, entrepreneurs and firms. Households work, consume,
purchase residential land and save through a one-period riskless discount bond.
Entrepreneurs consume, purchase capital and commercial land which they partly
finance with debt issuance that is collateralised by their capital stock and com-
mercial land holdings. Each firm, owned by the entrepreneurial sector, rents
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capital and land from the entrepreneur, and hires one worker from the household
sector to form an employment match.
Each employment match is subject to an idiosyncratic preference shock that
hits the worker. Intuitively, this shock can be thought of as a degree of ‘shirking’,
which is different across individuals. If the realisation of the shock is above
a certain threshold level, the employment relationship is discontinued. This
threshold level is lower and job separation is increased when aggregate credit
constraints tighten and economic conditions deteriorate. Another words, shirking
is not what will drive job separation in the model, but it is firms’ tolerance
to shirking that shrinks when aggregate credit constraints tighten, resulting in
increased firing activity.
The model builds on the work of Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013); Liu, Miao, and
Zha (2013), and the modelling of the labour market together with endogenous
job separation follows Ramey, den Haan, and Watson (2000), Krause and Lubik
(2007) and Trigari (2009).
3.1 Households
Each household can be thought of as a large extended family with a continuum
of employed and unemployed members. The utility function is written as:
U = E0
∞∑
s=0
βsh {log (Ch,t+s − hhCh,t+s−1) + ϕt+s logLh,t+s −Gt} , (3.1)
where Ch,t denotes consumption and hh is the degree of internal habit formation.
The parameter βh is the subjective discount factor, land holdings of the household
are denoted by Lh,t with the corresponding taste shifter ϕt referred to as a housing
demand shock, whereas Gt denotes the sum of disutilities from labour supply of
the employed household members. The housing demand shock, which will be the
key driver of the comovement between housing and labour markets, follows the
stationary process:
lnϕt = (1− ρϕ) ln ϕ¯+ ρϕ lnϕt−1 + σϕεϕ,t, (3.2)
where ϕ¯ > 0 is a constant, ρϕ ∈ (−1, 1) measures the persistence of the land
demand shock, σϕ is the standard deviation of the i.i.d innovation εϕ,t. Fol-
lowing Trigari (2009), each household member has the following disutility from
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supplying labour:
g (ht, at) = χ
h1+νt
1 + ν + 1at, (3.3)
where ht denotes labour hours with a scale parameter χ and an inverse Frisch
elasticity ν. Moreover, at is an idiosyncratic shock to the disutility of working
which is assumed to be i.i.d. across individuals and across time with cumulative
distribution function of the lognormal family F (a) with parameters µa and σa,
and density f . The indicator function 1 takes the value one (zero) if the individ-
ual is employed (unemployed). The sum of the disutilities of employed members
is equal to the family’s disutility from supplying labour hours, which is denoted
by Gt in equation 3.1. The flow-of-funds constraint is:
Ch,t + ql,t (Lh,t − Lh,t−1) + St
Rt
= WthtNt + St−1 + bZpt (1−Nt)− Tt, (3.4)
where Wt is the real wage, Rt is the gross riskfree return, St is the purchase in
period t of the loanable bond that pays off one unit of consumption good in all
states of the world in period t + 1, which is known in advance. In period 0, the
household starts with S−1 > 0 units of the loanable bonds. Tt refers to lump-sum
taxes, and unemployment benefit is denoted by b which is scaled by Zpt so that it
remains stationary relative to labour income. The household does not choose ht
or Nt, as these variables will be determined in the labour market equilibrium with
search and matching frictions. The household’s problem is to choose a sequence
{Ch,t, St, Lh,t}∞t=0 to maximise its utility. Using the flow-of-funds constraint 3.4,
this yields the familiar Euler-equation:
EtΛht,t+1Rt = 1, (3.5)
where λh,t ≡ 1Ch,t−hhCh,t−1 −Et
hhβh
Ch,t+1−hhCh,t is the marginal utility of consumption,
and Λht,t+1 ≡ Etβhλh,t+1/λh,t is the household’s stochastic discount factor. The
household’s first-order condition with respect to residential land is:
ql,t = EtΛht,t+1ql,t+1 + ϕt
uhl,t
λh,t
, (3.6)
where uhl,t is the marginal utility of residential land owned by the household.
Equation 3.6 implies that the land price is equal to the sum of the marginal rate
of substitution (MRS) of the household between land and consumption and the
expected discounted future land price. Note that the housing shock ϕt will take
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a centre stage in the analysis of the DSGE model.
3.2 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneur’s utility function is written as:
U = E0
∞∑
s=0
βs {log (Ce,t+s − heCe,t+s−1)} , (3.7)
where Ce,t denotes the entrepreneur’s consumption and he is the habit persis-
tence. The entrepreneur is endowed with K−1 units of initial capital stock and
L−1,e units of land. Capital accumulation follows the law of motion:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +
1− Ω2
(
It
It−1
− λ¯I
)2 It, (3.8)
where It is investment, λ¯I denotes the steady-state growth rate of investment, and
Ω > 0 is the adjustment cost parameter. The entrepreneur faces the following
flow-of-funds constraint:
Ce,t + ql,t (Le,t − Le,t−1) + It
Qt
+Bt−1 =
Bt
Rt
+Rk,tKt−1 +Rl,tLe,t−1 + Πt, (3.9)
where Bt−1 is the amount of matured entrepreneurial debt and Bt/Rt is the value
of new debt. Rl,t and Rk,t are the rental rates of land and capital, respectively.
Πt denotes profits, Qt is the investment-specific technological change, defined as
Qt = Qptνq,t, where the permanent component Qpt follows the stochastic process:
Qpt = Qpt−1λq,t, ln λq,t = (1− ρq) ln λ¯q + ρq ln λq,t−1 + σqεq,t, (3.10)
and the transitory component follows the stochastic process:
ln νq,t = ρνq ln νq,t−1 + σνqενq ,t. (3.11)
The parameter λ¯q is the steady-state growth rate of Qpt , the parameters ρq and
ρνq measure the degree of persistence. The innovations εq,t and ενq ,t are iid with
variances σ2q and σ2νq .
The entrepreneur’s ability to obtain credit is subject to the following collateral
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constraint:
Bt ≤ θtEt [ql,t+1Le,t + qk,t+1Kt] , (3.12)
where qk,t+1 is the shadow value of capital in consumption units, also referred
to as Tobin’s q. The credit constraint 3.12 limits the amount of borrowing by
a fraction of the gross value of the collateralisible assets: land and capital. As
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the credit constraint reflects problems of lim-
ited contract enforceability. Similar to Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) and Liu,
Miao, and Zha (2013), the credit constraint will be instrumental in propagat-
ing a shock ϕt to the household’s land demand condition (3.6) into increased
business investment. This is because increased land prices ql,t+1 raise the mar-
ket value of collateralisable assets, thereby increasing the borrowing capacity of
entrepreneurs.
As in Jermann and Quadrini (2012), the collateral constraint 3.12 is subject
to exogenous disturbances:
ln θt = (1− ρθ) ln θ + ρθ ln θt−1 + σθεθ,t (3.13)
where θ is the steady-state value of θt, and ρθ ∈ (0.1) is the persistence parameter,
and εθ,t is iid with variance σ2θ . The entrepreneur’s problem is to choose a
sequence {Ce,t, Bt, Kt, It, Le,t}∞t=0 to maximise utility.
3.3 The Labour Market
At the beginning of time t, there are ut unemployed workers looking for jobs, and
there are vt vacancies posted by producers. The technology of matching workers
with vacancies is:
mt = ψtuωt v1−ωt , (3.14)
where ω ∈ (0, 1) is the technology scaling parameter. The variable ψt is an
exogenous matching efficiency shock which follows the stationary process:
lnψt = (1− ρψ) ln ψ¯ + ρψ lnψt−1 + σψεψ,t, (3.15)
where ψ¯ > 0 is a constant, ρψ ∈ (−1, 1) measures the persistence and σψ is the
standard deviation of the i.i.d innovation εψ,t.
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The probability of an open vacancy being matched with a searching worker
is qvt = mt/vt (job filling rate), whereas the probability of an unemployed worker
being matched with an open vacancy is qut = mt/ut (job finding rate). Labour
market tightness is defined as Θt = vt/ut. The number of workers employed at
the beginning of time t is denoted by Nt−1. Before matching takes place, workers
lose their jobs with probability ρt before matching starts at time t. Job separation
has an exogenous, constant component, ρx, and an endogenous component, ρnt :
ρt = ρx + (1− ρx) ρnt . (3.16)
The endogenous component of job separation ρnt depends on whether the reali-
sation of the idiosyncratic preference shock at (equation 3.3) is above a certain
threshold a¯t, at which the employment relationship is discontinued:
ρnt = Pr (at > a¯t) = 1− F (a¯t) . (3.17)
The number of unemployed workers searching for jobs at time t is written as:
ut = 1− (1− ρt)Nt−1. (3.18)
The evolution of employment follows the law of motion:
Nt = (1− ρt)Nt−1 +mt, (3.19)
which implies that employment at the current period is the sum of the work-
ers that survived from the last period and the number of matches formed at
the beginning of the current period.9 Given the dynamics of employment, the
unemployment rate is determined by the identity Ut = 1−Nt.
3.4 Producers
Firms rent capital kt as well as entrepreneurial labour le,t, and produce only if
they match with a worker, using the following technology:
yt = Zt
(
lφe,tk
1−φ
t
)α
h1−αt ,
9The assumption regarding the timing of the probability of separation follows Krause and
Lubik (2007), and the timing of newly formed matches is the same as in Blanchard and Gali
(2010) and Liu, Miao, and Zha (2013). Changing these assumption has little quantitative
impact on the estimation. These results are available upon request.
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where α ∈ (0, 1) and φ ∈ (0, 1) are the output elasticities of the production
factors. The total factor productivity Zt is composed of a permanent component
Zpt and a transitory component νz,t such that Zt = Zpt νz,t, where the permanent
component Zpt follows the stochastic process:
Zpt = Zpt−1λz,t, ln λz,t = (1− ρz) ln λ¯z + ρz ln λz,t−1 + σzεz,t, (3.20)
and the transitory component follows the stochastic process:
ln νz,t = ρνz ln νz,t−1 + σνzενz ,t. (3.21)
The parameter λ¯z is the steady-state growth rate of Zpt , the parameters ρz and
ρνz measure the degree of persistence. The innovations εz,t and ενz ,t are iid with
variances σ2z and σ2νz .
A firm matched with a worker makes profits from the current-period produc-
tion, and continues to receive the value of the employment match (JFt ), if the
match survives (with probability 1− ρt) in the next period:
JFt = pit − wt (at)ht + EtΛet,t+1
[
(1− ρt+1)
ˆ a¯t
0
JFt+1 (at+1)
dF (at+1)
F (a¯t+1)
]
, (3.22)
implying that the value of the job depends on profits pit net the real wage, plus
the discounted continuation value. With probability 1 − ρt+1, the employment
relationship survives and earns the expected value, whereas with probability
ρt+1, job separation occurs leading to zero match value. Profits prior to wage
payments are determined as follows:
pit = max
kt,le,t
Zt
(
lφe,tk
1−φ
t
)
h1−αt −Rk,tkt −Rl,tle,t, (3.23)
where factor prices Rk,t and Rl,t are taken as given. The aggregate wage Wt not
only depends on aggregate factors but also on workers’ idiosyncratic preference
shocks:
Wt =
ˆ a¯t
0
wt (at)
dF (at+1)
F (a¯t+1)
. (3.24)
When the firm posts a job vacancy, it pays a vacancy cost κ, and the firm receives
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the value JFt when the vacancy is filled (with probability qvt ). If the vacancy is
not filled, the firm continues to have it open next period:
Vt = −κΓt + EtΛet,t+1
[
qvt (1− ρt+1)
ˆ a¯t
0
JFt+1 (at+1)
dF (at+1)
F (a¯t+1)
+ (1− qvt )Vt+1
]
,
(3.25)
where the term Γt is the growth factor (defined in Section D of the Appendix)
to ensure that the ratio of vacancy cost to output is stationary. Given that free
entry reduces the value of an open vacancy to zero (Vt = 0), equation 3.25 implies
the following optimality condition for vacancy posting:
κΓt
qvt
= EtΛet,t+1 (1− ρt+1)
ˆ a¯t
0
JFt+1 (at+1)
dF (at+1)
F (a¯t+1)
, (3.26)
which implies that the optimal vacancy posting is at the point where the benefit
of having a new employment match is equal to the cost of posting and maintaining
a vacancy.
3.5 The Labour Market and Nash Bargaining
After a worker is matched with a vacancy, the firm and the worker bargain over
the wage and working hours, defined as the following Nash bargaining problem:
max
Wt,ht
(
JWt − JUt
)ξt (
JFt
)1−ξt
. (3.27)
The term JWt in problem 3.27 denotes the current value of employment which
depends on the current wage, the disutility of working and the next period prob-
ability weighted value of job loss and of continued employment, written formally
as:
JWt = wt (at)ht−
g (ht, at)
λi,t
+EtΛht,t+1
[
(1− ρt+1)
ˆ a¯t
0
(
JWt+1 (at+1)− JUt+1
) dF (at+1)
F (a¯t+1)
+ JUt+1
]
.
(3.28)
The term JUt in problem 3.27 denotes the current value of unemployment which
depends on the unemployment benefit, the next period probability weighted value
of finding a job and of continued unemployment, written formally as:
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JUt = bΓt + EtΛht,t+1
[
qut (1− ρt+1)
ˆ a¯t
0
(
JWt+1 (at+1)− JUt+1
) dF (at+1)
F (a¯t+1)
+ JUt+1
]
.
(3.29)
The term ξt in problem 3.27 denotes the worker’s relative bargaining power,
which is subject to exogenous disturbances:
ln ξt = (1− ρξ) ln ξ¯t + ρψ ln ξt−1 + σξεξ,t, (3.30)
where ξ¯ > 0 is the steady-state value of the worker’s relative bargaining power,
which will be estimated. The parameter ρξ ∈ (−1, 1) measures the persistence
and σξ is the standard deviation of the i.i.d innovation εξ,t. The bargaining
solution is written as:
ξtJ
F
t = (1− ξt)
(
JWt − JUt
)
. (3.31)
Substituting the value of the match to the firm 3.22, the vacancy posting con-
dition 3.26, the value of employment 3.28 and the value of unemployment 3.29
into the bargaining solution 3.31 yields the optimal individual wage rate:
wt (at)ht = ξt (pit + κΓtΘt) + (1− ξt)
(
g (ht, at)
λh,t
+ bΓt
)
, (3.32)
where the marginal rate of substation (MRS) between leisure and consumption
is equal to the marginal product of labour, g′ (ht, at) /λh,t = (1− α) yt/ht. Note
that the optimal wage rate is different from the MRS because of the costs related
to vacancy posting and unemployment benefit in the current search and matching
framework. The bargained wage increases in labour market tightness Θt, the
outside option of work b and the realised value of the idiosyncratic preference
shock at. Given 3.24, the aggregate wage is written as:
Wtht = ξt (pit + κΓtΘt) + (1− ξt)
χh
1+ν
t
1+ν +
´ a¯t
0 at
dF (at+1)
F (a¯t+1)
λh,t
+ bΓt
 . (3.33)
Similar to Krause and Lubik (2007) and Trigari (2009), condition 3.32 splits
the wage into the costs and benefits of an employment match according to the
bargaining power ξt. Specifically, the wage compensates the worker up to ξt
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fraction of the firm’s profits and the saving of hiring costs, and up to (1 − ξt)
fraction of the disutility of labour and the foregone unemployment benefit.
Endogenous separation depends on the endogenous preference shock thresh-
old a¯t which in turn is determined by the zero joint surplus condition. The joint
surplus is written as:
St (at) = JFt + JWt − JUt
= pit − g (ht, at)
λh,t
− bΓt + EtΛet,t+1
[
(1− ξt+1qut ) (1− ρt+1)
ˆ a¯t
0
St+1 (at+1)
dF (at+1)
F (a¯t+1)
]
.
(3.34)
The total surplus equals current revenues net of the labour disutility and the
foregone unemployment benefit plus the continuation value of the employment
relationship. Job separation occurs whenever the realisation of the preference
shock reduces the value of the joint surplus to zero. The condition that deter-
mines the threshold value a¯t is St (a¯t) = 0, which allows condition 3.34 to be
written as:
pit − g (ht, a¯t)
λh,t
− bΓt + 1− ξt+1q
u
t
1− ξt+1
κΓt
qvt
= 0, (3.35)
which pins down the threshold value of the preference shock a¯t, above which job
separation occurs. Finally, using the forward value of 3.22, the vacancy posting
condition 3.26 can be rewritten as:
κΓt
qvt
= EtΛet,t+1 (1− ρt+1)
[
(1− α) Yt+1
Nt+1
−Wt+1ht+1 + κΓt+1
qvt+1
]
. (3.36)
3.6 Market Clearing
In a competitive equilibrium, the markets for goods, labour, land and bonds all
clear. The goods market clearing condition is:
Ce,t + Ch,t +
It
Qt
+ κΓtvt = Yt. (3.37)
The land market clearing condition implies:
Lh,t + Le,t = L¯, (3.38)
where L¯ is the fixed aggregate land endowment. The bond market clearing
condition implies:
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St = Bt. (3.39)
The capital market clearing condition is given by:
Kt−1 = Ntkt. (3.40)
I abstract from modelling government spending to simplify the analysis, and
assume that all unemployment benefits are financed by lump-sum taxes:
bΓt (1−Nt) = Tt. (3.41)
Aggregate output is given by:
Yt = Zt
[
(Kt−1)1−φ (Le,t−1)φ
]α
(htNt)1−α . (3.42)
A competitive search equilibrium consists of sequences of prices {Wt, ql,t, qk,t, Rt, Rk,t, Rl,t}∞t=0
and allocations {Ch,t, Lh,t, Bt}∞t=0 for households, allocations {Ce,t, It, Le,t, St, Kt}∞t=0
for entrepreneurs, and allocations {yt, kt, le,t,, ht}∞t=0 for each firm, and labour
market variables
{mt, ut, vt, Nt, qut , qvt , a¯t, ρt}∞t=0 such that (i) taking prices as given, the allocations
solve the optimising problems for the household, the entrepreneur and each firm,
(ii) new matches are formed based on the matching technology, with wages and
labour hours determined via the bilateral Nash-bargaining process, (iii) endoge-
nous separation satisfies the zero joint surplus condition, and (iv) all markets
clear.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Estimation
The model is log-linearised around the deterministic steady-state in which the
credit constraint is binding. The model is used to fit six quarterly UK time series:
real house prices, real per capita investment, real per capita output, real per
capita corporate (PNFC) debt, the unemployment rate and the job separation
rate. The data sample covers the period from 1985Q1 to 2012Q4.10 The choice
10Per capital measures are calculated based on the population series of people aged 16 or
above, obtained from the Labour Force Survey.
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of the starting date of the estimation period coincides with the liberalisation of
UK financial markets and the increasing reliance of the UK corporate sector on
external financing.11 In addition, the period before 1985 was characterised by
big structural changes in the UK labour markets (Pissarides, 2003).
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods as done in Smets andWouters
(2007), Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014)
amongst others. The model parameters are partitioned into three subsets. The
first subset of deep parameters is estimated. The second subset is calibrated
using steady-state relations or previous studies. The third subset contains the
estimated parameters of shock processes.
The estimated parameters collected in the vector Ψ1 =
{
hh, he, ν,Ω, gy, λ¯q, ξ¯
}
,
consist of the habit parameters hh and he, the inverse Frisch-elasticity ν, the in-
vestment adjustment cost parameter Ω, the growth rate of per capita output gy
and that of investment λ¯q, and the relative bargaining power of workers ξ¯. The
calibrated parameters, collected in the vector Ψ2 = {β, χ, α, φ, δ, θ,m, a, µa, σa, κ, b},
consist of the subjective discount factor β, the leisure preference parameter χ,
the production parameters α and φ, the depreciation rate δ, the average loan-
to-asset ratio θ, the scale and elasticity parameters of the matching function m
and ξ¯, the mean and the standard deviation of the lognormal distribution for the
idiosyncratic preference shock, µa and σa, the vacancy cost parameter κ and the
unemployment benefit parameter b.
The habit parameters follow a beta distribution with shape parameters a =
1.5 and b = 1.5, implying a symmetric prior distribution with 70% probability the
parameters lying between 0.2 and 0.8.12 The same prior is used for the bargaining
power parameter ξ¯, similar to Faccini, Millard, and Zanetti (2013). The prior for
the investment adjustment cost parameter Ω follows a gamma distribution with
shape parameter a = 4 and rate parameter b = 2, implying that with 99% prior
probability Ω is smaller than 5, covering most calibrated and estimated values in
11The process of financial liberalisation started with the abolition of exchange controls in
1979 and of controls on bank lending (‘the Corset’) in 1980, after which banks were free to
compete with building societies in the market of real estate finance. During this period, the
reliance of the corporate sector on externally raised finance increased rapidly, compared to
the 1970s when internally generated funds were the dominant form of corporate finance. See
Chapter 2 of Buckle and Thompson (1992) for further details.
12Note that the corresponding mean µ and standard deviation σ of the Beta distribution is
calculated as µ = a/ (a+ b) and σ =
√
ab/
(
(a+ b)2 (a+ b+ 1)
)
.
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the literature.13 The prior for the inverse of the Frisch-elasticity ν also follows a
gamma distribution with shape parameters a = 4 and b = 4, implying that with
99% prior probability ν is less than 2.5.
As for the second subset of parameters Ψ2, the subjective discount factor is
chosen β such that the annualised real interest rate is 4%, the patience parameter
is pinned down by the estimated growth rate gy. The depreciation rate δ is
pinned down by the steady-state investment-capital ratio which is set to be 0.18
at annual level. The steady-state capital-output ratio is set to be 1, implying
a steady-state investment-output ratio 0.18 at annual level, which is consistent
with UK data and somewhat lower than in the US (0.20). The parameter χ is
chosen such that the steady-state hours is set to h = 0.25 in steady-state. The
average labour income share is 70%, α = 0.3. The share of land in production
φ is pinned down by the steady-state ratio of entrepreneurial land to output
(qlLe/Y ), which is set to 1.8 based on the estimated total value of commercial
real estate in the UK, which fluctuated between £580-870billion over the 2003-
2013 period14 (PDR, 2014). To construct a measure for the average loan-to-value
ratio θ, I use the binding credit constraint 3.12 in steady-state:
θ = B
qlLe + qkK
, (4.1)
where the value is calibrated to θ = 0.72, based on the following calculation:
over the period 2003-2012 I compute the average ratio of net financial liabilities
of non-financial corporations (B) over the sum of (i) machinery, equipment and
other buildings and structures that are not related to dwellings (qkK) and (ii)
the estimated value of commercial real estate (qlLe).15
The elasticity of the matching function is set to a = 0.7 following the estimate
of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for the UK. Following Faccini, Millard, and
Zanetti (2013), I set the steady-state separation rate to be ρ = 0.03, and follow-
ing Zanetti (2011) the exogenous fraction is set to be ρx = 0.02, which implies the
13Note that the corresponding mean µ and standard deviation σ of the Gamma distribution
is calculated as µ = a/b and σ =
√
a/b2.
14Commercial property is defined as including retail, offices and industrial premises as well
as other commercial types typically used for business purposes such as leisure (cinemas, fitness
clubs and gyms, leisure parks, etc.), hotels, petrol stations and other miscellaneous types (PDR,
2014).
15Over the 2003-2012 period, average net financial liabilities of non-financial corporations
amounted to £1800billion, whereas buildings and structures were about £1200billion and ma-
chinery and equipment were £590billion. The average value of commercial real estate was
estimated to be £690billion over the same period.
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Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distributions of Structural Parameters
Parameter Prior Posterior
Distribution a b Mode Std
hh Beta(a,b) 1.50 1.50 0.0077 0.0112
he Beta(a,b) 1.50 1.50 0.0457 0.0683
Ω Gamma(a,b) 4.00 2.00 0.0738 0.0303
ν Gamma(a,b) 4.00 4.00 2.8017 0.6335
ξ¯ Beta(a,b) 1.50 1.50 0.4258 0.0381
100 (gγ − 1) Gamma(a,b) 1.86 3.01 0.6149 0.1553
100
(
λ¯q − 1
)
Gamma(a,b) 1.86 3.01 0.2253 0.2428
ρz Beta(a,b) 1.50 1.50 0.4743 0.0631
ρνz Beta(a,b) 1.50 1.50 0.4742 0.0654
ρq Beta(a,b) 1.50 1.50 0.1614 0.0846
ρνq Beta(a,b) 1.50 1.50 0.0843 0.1187
ρϕ Beta(a,b) 1.50 1.50 0.9996 0.0000
ρξ Beta(a,b) 1.50 1.50 0.9528 0.0180
ρθ Beta(a,b) 1.50 1.50 0.9828 0.0102
ρm Beta(a,b) 1.50 1.50 0.9642 0.0124
σz Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0056 0.0004
σνz Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0001 0.0000
σq Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0128 0.0015
σνq Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0065 0.0018
σϕ Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0472 0.0036
σξ Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0942 0.0097
σθ Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0110 0.0010
σm Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0345 0.0024
Note: The parameters a and b denote the shape and scale parameters of the corresponding prior distributions.
To construct the posterior distribution, two chains of 250,000 draws were sampled from the Random Walk
Metropolis Hastings algorithm. The estimation is monitored to deliver an acceptance rate of around 30%. The
estimation is computed using version 4.2.2. of the Dynare toolbox.
steady-state threshold value of the lognormally distributed idiosyncratic prefer-
ence shock to be a¯ = 2.25, given the parameters µa = 0 and σa = 0.35 similar to
that used in Trigari (2009).16
The steady-state unemployment rate is set to U = 8%, which is lower than
the value used by Faccini, Millard, and Zanetti (2013) (10%) and closer to the
average UK unemployment rate over the 1985Q1-2012Q4 period (7.5%). The
16The parameter choice for σa delivers standard deviation of the job finding rates (24%) that
is similar to that (25%) observed in the extended data of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008). As
a robustness check, I have re-estimated the model using the values σa = [0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.4, 0.45],
but the estimated decompositions presented in the rest of the paper do not materially change.
These results are available upon request.
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implied steady-state job finding rate is qu = 0.26, which is between the value
used by Faccini, Millard, and Zanetti (2013) based on the Labour Force Survey
(0.35) and the average value over the estimation period based on the claimant
count data used by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) (0.19). The values for κ and
b are pinned down by the vacancy posting and separation conditions, respectively.
For the third subset of parameters characterising the structural shock pro-
cesses, I follow Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) in adopting agnostic priors and setting
a beta distribution for the persistence parameters that lie with 90% prior proba-
bility in the interval [0.0256, 0.7761], and setting an inverse gamma distribution
for the standard deviations that lie with 90% prior probability in the interval
[0.0001, 2].
Table 2 summarises the prior distributions and presents the estimates at the
posterior modes together with the standard deviations.17 The posterior dis-
tributions are constructed using 250,000 draws from the MCMC chain. The
estimated habit parameters, hh and he, suggest that both types of agents have
low degrees of habit persistence, which is in line with the recent UK estimates
of Faccini, Millard, and Zanetti (2013); Burgess, Fernandez-Corugedo, Groth,
Harrison, Monti, Theodoridis, and Waldron (2013). Similar to Liu, Wang, and
Zha (2013), the investment adjustment cost parameter Ω is estimated to be very
small compared to the estimates of standard DSGE models without financial
frictions. The steady-state growth rate of the permanent component of TFP
is estimated to be larger (0.61) than that of the investment-specific technolog-
ical change (0.22). The posterior mean of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labour supply ν is larger (2.8) than one as in Faccini, Millard, and Zanetti
(2013), suggesting larger labour supply adjustment at the extensive margin as
opposed to adjustments at the intensive margin as recently shown for the US
by Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), and Liu, Miao, and Zha (2013). The estimated
relative bargaining power of workers ξ¯ is around 0.43 that is somewhat lower
than the recent estimate of Kamber and Millard (2012). As for the estimated
structural shock series, the housing and collateral shocks are highly persistent
and have large standard deviations relative to the other structural shocks, as
found by Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) for the US recently.
17To check for the recurring problem of parameter identification in DSGE models, I measure
the identification strength as proposed by Iskrev (2010), and find that all parameters evaluated
at their prior means have a non-negligible contribution to the first and second moment of the
data, and therefore regarded as locally identified. These results are available upon request.
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4.2 The Impact and Importance of Housing Shocks
Given the estimated modes of the parameter values, the impulse responses are
calculated to assess the effects of an exogenous shocks to housing demand ϕt, as
shown in Figure 3. The IRFs are normalised to deliver 1% increase in real house
prices.
Figure 3: The Impact of Housing Shocks in the DSGE model
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Note: The black lines represent the IRFs to a housing shock in the DSGE model using the estimated posterior
modes of the parameters. The IRFs are normalised to give a 1% increase in house prices.
The results shows that shocks to house prices generate an economic expansion
with a 0.2% peak impact on output. The unemployment rate falls -1% below
its steady-state value (8%) that is consistent with the results from the BVAR
model 2. As in Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), the main mechanism of the present
DSGE model is the one related to the collateral channel (Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997): a positive shock to house prices increases the borrowing capacity of the
entrepreneur leading to increasing demand for capital and commercial real estate
resulting in an economic expansion. As a result, profits pit, the value of an em-
ployment match JFt and the current value of vacancies κΓtqvt all increase, resulting
in increased job creation and labour market tightness, thereby movements along
the downward-sloping Beveridge curve.
Moreover, the present model also features endogenous wage rigidity that the
housing shock induces. This is because the direct effect of the housing pref-
erence shock is to generate a substitution away from non-durable to durable
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consumption. In turn, the collateral channel propagates the shock to generate
an overall economic expansion, and the resulting wealth effect has a positive
effect on non-durable consumption. The net effect of a positive housing shock
in the current estimation is to generate small and positive movements in the
marginal utility of non-durable consumption of the household λh,t. Therefore,
workers’ power during the bilateral wage bargaining process increases by little
in spite of the economic expansion. To inspect this issue further, it is useful to
compare the housing shock to other traditional business cycle shocks such as a
permanent shock to investment-specific technological change. Figure 21 of the
Appendix confirms that the effect of the technology shock on consumption and
therefore on λh,t is an order of magnitude higher than that of the housing shock.
The technology shock therefore substantially increases workers’ power during the
bilateral bargaining process leading to large increases in wages, which reduces
firms’ incentives for vacancy creation (Shimer, 2005). In contrast, the housing
shock generates relatively little variation in non-durable consumption and wages,
therefore it can induce substantial volatility in labour market quantities.
This “labour channel” of the housing shock (Liu, Miao, and Zha, 2013) has
additional consequences in the present model via the equilibrium condition 3.35
determining endogenous job separation. It is instructive to rewrite this condition
in log-linearised form18:
ˆ¯at = ω1
(
Yˆt − Nˆt
)
+ ω2Θˆt + λˆh,t. (4.2)
The zero joint surplus condition implies that increases in labour productivity
Yˆt− Nˆt and in labour market tightness Θˆt are positively related to the threshold
value of the preference shock ˆ¯at.19 The labour productivity term in equation 4.2
captures the current joint payoff from continuing the employment relationship,
whereas the labour tightness term represents the expected future joint payoffs. A
key question is related to the dynamics of the marginal utility of consumption λˆh,t
in response to shocks. To the extent that housing shocks generate little variation
in λˆh,t, a positive housing shock can thereby generate substantial increases in
the threshold value ˆ¯at. Note that this is not necessarily the case in the presence
of highly procyclical consumption induced by the investment-specific technology
18Here we assume no shocks to the bargaining power ξt for expositional purposes.
19The parameters ω1 and ω2 are functions of the model’s deep parameters and steady-state
values: ω1 ≡ λ˜ha¯ ν(1−α)1+ν Y˜N and ω2 ≡ λ˜ha¯
κΘ(ωΘω−1/ψ¯−ξ)
(1−ξ) . Under realistic parameterisations, it is
true that ωΘω−1/ψ¯ > ξ.
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shock for example. In this case, as shown by Figure 21, the fall in λˆh,t is so
large that workers’ threshold value of the work preference shock a¯t actually falls,
leading to increased job separation and unemployment.
The positive housing shock increases the threshold value a¯t, which in turn
lowers endogenous as well as total separation through equations 3.16–3.17. It
thereby triggers an immediate fall in the number of unemployed workers searching
for jobs, hence pushing down on the unemployment rate. While Liu, Miao, and
Zha (2013) studied the role of the collateral channel in driving job creation
via changing the value of a new employment match 3.22, the present model
emphasises the additional channel via changing the destruction rate of existing
employment matches. Note that the DSGE estimation results suggest that the
impact of house price shocks is larger on job separation rates than on job findings
rates.
The presence of endogenous job destruction is not only motivated by the
conditional and unconditional time-series properties of job separation rates, but
it also allows the model to capture potentially sizeable shifts in the Beveridge
curve that have recently been documented by Hobijn and Sahin (2013) and Dia-
mond and Sahin (2015) amongst others. Models with exogenous separation rates
such as Liu and Leduc (2013) and Liu, Miao, and Zha (2013) focus on responses
of equilibrium vacancy and unemployment caused by a movement along the
downward-sloping Beveridge curve. My model allows for quantitatively impor-
tant shifts in the Beveridge curve. To demonstrate this, I follow the steady-state
analysis of section 2.3 of Pissarides (2000) and provide a pictorial representa-
tion of the Beveridge curve. Using the steady-states of the matching function
3.14 and the definitions of the endogenous separation 3.16–3.17 and employment
3.18–3.19, vacancies can be written as:
v =
(
1− F (a¯) (1− ρx)
ψF (a¯) (1− ρx)
1− u
uω
) 1
1−ω
(4.3)
The papers by Liu and Leduc (2013) and Liu, Miao, and Zha (2013) provide
a similar steady-state analysis (with exogenous separation rates) and use a 2-
dimensional (stylised) graph to represent the inverse relation between vacan-
cies and unemployment. In that framework aggregate shocks such as housing
shocks affect labour market dynamics by changing the value new employment
matches, thereby rotating the job creation curve and causing movements along
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the downward-sloping Beveridge curve.
Figure 4: The Beveridge Curve in the DSGE Model
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Note: The graph is constructed by using the grids a¯ = [0.8× a¯ss : 0.016 : 1.2× a¯ss], u = [0.02 : 0.01 : 0.2] to
compute vacancies v via the formula 4.3.
In contrast, Figure 4 uses the calibrated parameter values to construct a 3-
dimensional graph that represents the inverse relation between vacancies and
unemployment, as a function of the threshold value of the preference shock a¯.
The figure shows that higher levels of a¯ correspond to inwardly shifted Beveridge
curves. This matters for the following reason. In addition to movements along
the Beveridge curve caused by rotation in the job creation curve, my model
can generate quantitatively important inward (outward) shifts in the Beveridge
curve when labour market tightness increases (decreases) and the threshold value
of the preference shock a¯ rises (falls), as illustrated by Figure 4.20 Allowing
for endogenous job separation therefore enables the model to explain important
historical episodes such as, for example, the UK recession in the early 1990s
characterised by a large outward shift in the Beveridge curve and coincidentally
by one of the largest real estate market collapses in the country’s post-war history.
Figures 15 and 17 of the Appendix provide a visual illustration of this point.
20The net effect on vacancies is therefore theoretically ambiguous. However, in the log-linear
dynamics of my model, the former effect dominates the latter (as also discussed in section 2.3
of Pissarides (2000)): house price shocks have an immediate procyclical effect on vacancies,
though they subsequently fall slightly below their steady-states about a year after the shock
and stay there before returning to steady-state. This is shown by the lower middle panel of
Figure 2.
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Table 3: Posterior Variance Decomposition
Housing Collateral Labour Techn Housing Collateral Labour Techn
Output House Price
4Q 20.44 20.21 7.60 51.75 93.89 0.21 0.23 5.67
8Q 18.26 22.75 14.11 44.87 94.11 0.42 0.15 5.32
16Q 14.13 23.95 24.42 37.50 95.32 0.96 0.13 3.59
24Q 12.87 23.86 29.71 33.57 96.16 1.12 0.16 2.56
Investment Corporate Debt
4Q 34.21 56.17 1.72 7.91 21.28 44.20 0.07 34.45
8Q 27.64 53.90 5.58 12.89 18.79 48.60 0.42 32.19
16Q 22.73 49.36 9.64 18.28 15.50 55.35 1.61 27.54
24Q 22.64 47.34 10.37 19.65 13.58 59.34 2.59 24.49
Unemployment Rate Job Separation Rate
4Q 25.28 10.41 59.92 4.39 34.74 13.54 45.17 6.55
8Q 18.31 6.98 70.33 4.38 26.15 9.69 55.14 9.02
16Q 11.69 4.30 79.54 4.47 18.96 8.04 63.13 9.87
24Q 9.86 4.31 81.44 4.39 16.44 8.44 65.80 9.33
Note: For each variable, variance decompositions over different horizons are generated by the DSGE model
evaluated at the mode of the posterior distribution. The housing and collateral shocks are treated separately.
The labour shock combines the effects of the matching efficiency and bargaining shocks. The column ’Techn’
combines the effects of permanent and transitory shocks to TFP and investment-specific technological change.
To further explore the model’s quantitative implications, I use the estimated
modes of the parameters to calculate forecast error variance decompositions
(FEVD) for some of the key observed macroeconomic variables. Table 3 shows
that the housing shock alone explains about 10-20% of output fluctuations, and
20-35% of investment, credit, unemployment and separation rate fluctuations
over the two-year horizon.
Overall, the two financial shocks (i.e. the housing shock and the collateral
shock) explain more than half of investment fluctuations and about third of out-
put fluctuations in the UK. These results confirm recent findings of Jermann and
Quadrini (2012), Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) and Christiano, Motto, and Ros-
tagno (2014) regarding the importance of financial shocks in the US. Technology-
type shocks continue to be an important source of business cycle fluctuations in
the UK mainly because of their contribution to consumption volatility. They
do however explain little of labour market fluctuations (Shimer (2005)). These
results are quantitatively similar to recent UK findings presented by Faccini,
Millard, and Zanetti (2013). Labour market shocks, not surprisingly, have large
effects on unemployment and separation rates, but they propagate little into
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house prices and investment. However, their importance for output fluctuations
increases with the horizon, which is consistent with the recent literature since
Smets and Wouters (2007).21
Figure 5: Comparing the DSGE and BVAR Identified Housing Shocks
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Note: The black solid (blue dashed) line is the housing shock series from the DSGE (BVAR(1)) models. The
shocks are normalised by the estimated standard deviations that are 0.023 and 0.047 for the BVAR and the
DSGE, respectively.
To take a closer look at the properties of the housing shock, Figure 5 plots the
estimated time-path of the identified shock series in BVAR and DSGE models. In
terms of the statistical implications, the two series have a high, 79%, correlation.
This suggests that while providing a structural interpretation of how house prices
can affect labour markets via the collateral channel, the DSGE model comes close
to recovering the structural shock series implied by a reduced-form BVAR model.
In terms of the historical implications, Figure 5 suggests that the early 1990s were
characterised by larger shocks to house prices than the recent Great Recession.
To quantify the relevance of house price shocks and the collateral channel, the
next subsection will compute the counter-factual paths of the UK economy that
would have been realised if housing shocks had been absent.
21To further explore the model’s quantitative implications relative to the BVAR model,
Figure 22 of the Appendix shows the results for the DSGE model (blue line) as well as for the
BVAR model (black line with orange shaded area). The results suggest that the estimated
theoretical model, while providing a structural interpretation of the observed comovements in
question, can not only recover the time path of the first moments of these key observables,
conditional on house price shocks, but can also come close to recovering the time path of the
conditional second moments implied by the BVAR model.
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Note that, as a robutness check, the model is re-estimated after using per
capital consumption instead of per capital investment as an observable. Section
G.2 of the Appendix shows that the dynamics of the housing shocks are preserved.
4.3 Causes of the 1990-91 and 2008-09 UK Recessions
The early 1990s were characterised one of the largest collapse of real estate prices
in UK post-war economic history. Real house prices started falling rapidly in
1989Q2 and by 1995Q4 the accumulated loss in real value amounted to almost
40%. A large fraction of the initial collapse is interpreted by both the DSGE and
the BVAR models as being unrelated to other structural shocks in the economy,
and the collapse was mainly driven by housing shocks as shown by Figure 5.
About a year after the initial shock, in 1990Q2, unemployment started rising
from 6.9%, and continued to increase for eleven consecutive quarters, reaching
10.6% by 1993Q1.
Figure 6 shows the counter factual paths (blue dash lines) along the actual
macroeconomic outcome (black solid lines). In the counter-factual economy,
house price growth would have been stable, and the fall in output would have
been muted mainly because corporate credit growth would have remained pos-
itive all the way till 1991Q1, supporting business investment and to a smaller
degree consumption. The implications for labour markets are vast: the unem-
ployment rate would have remained below 7.5% throughout the recession. Note
that the decomposition also suggests that house price booms preceding the crisis
contributed significantly to low unemployment rates and economic activity in
the late 1980s.
During the recent Great Recession, real UK house prices and real GDP con-
tracted by about 20% and 7%, respectively, over the period from 2007Q3 to
2009Q2. During the same period, the unemployment rate rose from 5.3% to
7.7%. To explore the contribution of negative house price shocks via the col-
lateral channel to the UK macroeconomy, I compute what would have been the
counter-factual time-path of the business cycle, if housing shocks had been ab-
sent.
Figure 7 shows the counter factual paths (blue dash lines) along the actual
macroeconomic outcome (black solid lines). Without shocks to house prices, we
would not have observed the series of consecutive negative house price growth
rates starting from 2007Q3 and reaching a trough of -6.2% in 2008Q4. Adverse
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Figure 6: The 1990-91 UK recession - the Contribution of House Price Shocks
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Note: To construct the counter-factual time paths of the variables, the contribution of the estimated housing
demand shocks is subtracted from the observables, using the median values from the estimation.
housing shocks started feeding in the macroeconomy by the beginning of 2008:
(i) they caused the quarterly output growth rate to be more than 1% points
lower on average throughout 2008, and (ii) contributed to the rapid increase in
the unemployment rate. In fact, the estimation results suggest that the unem-
ployment rate that reached 7.8% by 2009, would have remained below 6% till
the end of 2009, had house prices not collapsed.
The reason why negative house price shocks had such large effects on the
macroeconomy and on labour markets is because their impact on corporate bor-
rowing via the collateral channel. In fact, as shown in Figure 7, quarterly cor-
porate credit growth would have remained positive throughout 2008, had house
prices not collapsed.
Though the estimation provides strong evidence on the causal link between
housing shocks and the macroeconomy during the recent crisis, this channel does
not explain the full story, and other mechanisms were also likely to play an impor-
tant role. For example, shocks to house prices explain a large part of corporate
credit contraction in 2008, but they explain little of the ensuing tightening of
corporate credit. The period 2009-2010 is interpreted by the estimation as be-
ing largely driven by adverse shocks to the collateral constraint (Jermann and
Quadrini, 2012), suggesting that disruptions in financial intermediation (unre-
lated to the housing market) were responsible to the continuing corporate credit
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Figure 7: The 2008 UK recession - the Contribution of House Price Shocks
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Note: To construct the counter-factual time paths of the variables, the contribution of the estimated housing
demand shocks is subtracted from the observables, using the median values from the estimation..
squeeze. Future work could extend the present model by modelling financial
intermediaries explicitly.
4.4 Explaining the Vacancy-Unemployment Ratio
To provide external validation on the DSGE model, I compare the estimated
vacancy-unemployment ratio implied by the model to that implied by an off-
model empirical estimation. The off-model estimation uses vacancy data from
the ONS’s Vacancy Survey of businesses and from Job Centres22 to calculate
quarterly averages of the monthly ratio of the vacancy rate to the unemployment
rate. This is then detrended with a linear trend to obtain a series comparable
with the DSGE counterpart.
Figure 8 confirms that the DSGE model (magenta line) tracks closely the off-
model estimate of the vacancy-unemployment ratio (black line). The model does
well in matching the substantial drop in labour market tightness during the 1990s
recession, the subsequent gradual increase till the mid 2000s and (to a smaller
extent) the drop during the recent Great Recession. Note that the DSGE model
22Seasonally adjusted data from ONS’s Vacancy Survey of businesses, starting in 2001, in-
clude the stock of vacancies in all industries excluding those in agriculture, forestry and fishing.
For the period 1985-2001, I use spliced and seasonally adjusted data from Job Centre records,
which offers a less complete coverage because employers are under no obligation to notify
vacancies to Job Centres.
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Figure 8: The Vacancy-Unemployment Ratio: DSGE and Off-model Estimates
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Note: The modes of the estimated parameters are used to compute the % deviation of the ratio of the vacancy
rate and the unemployment rate (magenta solid line) and the contribution of the housing shock to this series
(green diamond line) in the DSGE model. The off-model estimate (black dashed line) is constructed by de-
meaning and linearly detrending the logarithm of the ratio of the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate,
where vacancy data are from the ONS’s Vacancy Survey and Job Centres records.
attributes a considerable amount of power to the housing shock (green line) in
explaining the dynamics of the vacancy-unemployment ratio, especially during
the outbreak of the two recessions.
These results challenge some of the previous findings that interpreted the
early 1990s recessions and the corresponding movements in the Beveridge curve
as entirely policy-induced.23 While the policy-based narrative may well explain
some fraction of the observed dynamics, my results corroborate the presence of
additional factors related to the collateral channel.24
In addition, Figure 8 confirms that my model with housing shocks and the col-
lateral channel can explain the relatively large volatility of the vacancy-unemployment
ratio that is not only a feature of the US (Shimer, 2005) but also of the UK labour
market (Amaral and Tasci, 2014). Figure 23 of the Appendix shows a similar
23For example, Pissarides (2003) argues that entering the ERM together with unsustainably
high inflation rates (as a result of expansionary policy related to the 1987 elections) forced
the UK central bank to rapidly tighten monetary policy in 1990 leading to sharply increasing
unemployment rates via the short-run Phillips curve.
24These findings are in line with previous work on the balance sheet channel in the UK. For
example, Hall (2001) links the depth and persistence of the UK recession of the early 1990s
to the tightening of corporate borrowing constraints and the resulting prolonged weakness of
corporate investment growth.
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decomposition of the vacancy-unemployment ratio for the transitory and per-
manent components of the technology shocks. The results suggest that both
types of technology shocks explain very little of the variation in labour market
volatility, which is in line with the findings of Shimer (2005).
4.5 The Role of Endogenous Job Separation
To explore the role of endogenous job separation in determining the propagation
of the housing shock on labour markets, I set the steady-state value of the en-
dogenous share of total separation to zero (ρ = ρx). Figure 9 shows the IRFs
from the benchmark model along the IRFs from the model without endogenous
separation.
The results are in line with Ramey, den Haan, and Watson (2000) who show
that aggregate shocks can be largely amplified by endogenous job separation.
Indeed my findings suggest the impact of a housing shock, that increases house
prices by 1%, would have an 0.03% points higher peak impact on output in the
model with endogenous separation than in the model with exogenous separation.
To put the results into perspective, a housing shock that would lead to a 20%
collapse in house prices (as in 2008), would lead to a peak increase of about 1.9%
points in the unemployment rate after about three quarters, if one allows for
endogenous job separation. In contrast, the same shock would generate ‘only’ a
peak increase of 0.8% points in the unemployment rate over the same horizon,
if endogenous separation were absent. This would also imply that output would
fall by 4% when separation is endogenous as opposed to the fall of 3.4% in case
of exogenous separation.25
These results may have important implications for other studies that focused
on the US recession. For example, Liu, Miao, and Zha (2013) estimated the
impact of housing shocks on the US unemployment rate but without accounting
for the possibility of endogenously fluctuating separation rates. They find that
a shock that leads to a 20% collapse in land prices in the US would generate an
increase of the unemployment rate by 0.68% points, which is close to my estimate
(0.8% points) for the UK with exogenous separation, shown by the black solid
lines in Figure 9 above.26 Given that separation rates increased sharply not just
25To obtain these number, I used the peak impact on Figure 9, and calculated 0.0118×U ×
20 = 1.9 and 0.005×U×20 = 0.8, where U = 8% is the steady-state value of the unemployment
rate. For output, I calculate the peak effect as 0.17× 20 = 3.4 and 0.2× 20 = 4.
26Note that the difference between these multipliers with and without endogenous separa-
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Figure 9: The Role of Endogenous Job Separation
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Note: The modes of the estimated parameters are used to calculate the IRFs for the two models. The IRFs are
normalised such that the housing shocks increases house prices by 1%.
in the UK but also in the US during the Great Recession, the results of Liu,
Miao, and Zha (2013) may underestimate the true impact of housing shocks on
US labour markets by not modelling endogenous separation explicitly.
4.6 US versus UK Housing Shocks
This section revisits the role of housing shocks as in Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013);
Liu, Miao, and Zha (2013) by re-estimating the BVAR model, analysed in Section
2, on US data covering the period 1977Q3-2010Q4. Figure 10 shows the impulse
response functions from the nine-variable BVAR(2) model. The results show that
housing shocks do have a non-trivial effect on job separation rates in the US as
well. This suggests that ignoring endogenous separation in the theoretical model
may indeed lead to an underestimation of the comovement between housing and
labour markets. Note that the effect is smaller on job separation rates (0.6%)
than on job finding rates (2%), which is in line with previous literature regarding
the relatively more acyclical nature of US job separation rates (Shimer, 2005,
2012).
However, the time-profile of the effect is different: the peak effect on separa-
tion rates comes much earlier (after about three quarters) than the peak effect on
tion may increase substantially, if the steady-state share of endogenous separation in total
separation is increased from ρn = 0.01. These results are available upon request.
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Figure 10: The Effects of a House Price Shock in the US
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Note: The identification is with Choleski ordering. The sample period is 1977Q3 - 2010Q4. Each plot shows
the pointwise median, 32nd-68th and 5th-95th percentiles from the posterior. Data source: Liu, Wang, and
Zha (2013) and separation and job finding rates are from Barnichon and Nekarda (2012).
job finding rates (after about six quarters). This suggests that separation rates
may play an important role in the short-term propagation of housing shocks
into US labour markets, whereas job finding rates are responsible for the long-
run persistence of the effects. One implication is that the model of Liu, Miao,
and Zha (2013) would likely generate a larger and more realistic multiplier if it
accounted for endogenous job separation.
An additional difference between the US and the UK is related to the impact
on credit markets: while housing shocks seem to have a larger impact on corpo-
rate credit than on household credit in the UK, the opposite is true in the US:
the BVAR(2) model suggests that the peak impact on household debt is much
larger than that on corporate debt, based on the median estimates. These results
are in line with the recent work of Mian and Sufi (2011, 2014b,a) emphasising
the role of the collateral channel on the household sector. Additional hypothe-
ses that future research could test are whether (i) the relatively muted response
of US corporate credit implies that the aggregate corporate collateral channel
is weaker in the US than in the UK, and (ii) this may partly explain why the
conditional volatility of US job separation rate is lower than in the UK.27
27In a related work, Sterk (2015) studies the conditional correlation between house prices,
household credit and job finding rates in the US (which seems larger than that in the UK).
He shows that house prices in the US affect real activity via the household collateral channel,
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Figure 11: Housing Shocks in the US and the UK
1989 1989.5 1990 1990.5
−0.12
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
1990 recession
 
 
US housing shock
UK housing shock
2006.5 2007 2007.5 2008 2008.5 2009
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
2008 recession
Note: The modes of the estimated parameters are used to calculate the Kalman-smoothed shock series in the
DSGE model of Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) (solid black line) and of the present paper (dashed magenta line).
Moreover, one of the notable features of the Great Recession was the syn-
chronisation of the meltdown of financial markets and the correlation in output
falls across countries. A popular narrative is that the crisis was triggered by the
bursting of the housing bubble in the US subprime mortgage market, which sub-
sequently spilled over to UK banks that had large exposures to foreign housing
markets. To investigate this narrative further, the UK housing shock identi-
fied by the DSGE model is compared to that identified by Liu, Wang, and Zha
(2013) recently. The correlation of the two shocks series is about 30% for the
overlapping period (1985Q1-2010Q4).
The correlation does not seem to be high for the whole sample, however
it is more pronounced during the two crisis periods studied above. Figure 11
shows that the large negative shocks to the UK housing market in 1989 and 2007
indeed coincided with large negative shocks to the US housing market, pointing to
the possibly synchronised nature of housing shocks especially during downturns.
Investigating further these international dimensions may be a fruitful avenue for
future research.
because unemployed homeowners more often turn down job offers that would require them to
move, in response to declines in their home equity levels.
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5 Conclusion
This paper presented evidence on the strong comovements between macroeco-
nomic and labour market variables in the UK. The comovement between house
prices and job separation rates is particularly striking and is not only a feature of
the recent crisis, but characterises at least the last 30 years of UK business cycles.
A DSGE model with credit constrained firms and search and matching frictions
in labour markets was used to explain these empirical regularities. I find that
shocks to house prices (that are unrelated to other structural disturbances in the
economy such as technology shocks) explain about 10-20% of output fluctuations
and about 20-30% of fluctuations unemployment and job separation rates via the
collateral channel over the forecast horizon.
Given the increased importance of labour market variables in the recent pol-
icy debate in the UK (particularly the choice of the unemployment rate as a key
indicator in designing forward guidance) as well as the increased financial sta-
bility concerns regarding house price dynamics, it is vital to better understand
the drivers of the striking comovement between house prices and labour markets.
The present paper offered one possible narrative that can explain some fraction
of this comovement. Future work should test alternative channels. This could
include the extension of the present model by modelling the household sector in
more detail with special regard to household debt dynamics and related demand
channels.
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Appendix For Online Publication
A Data Construction
Baseline observables The baseline DSGE model is estimated on six UK ag-
gregate time series: real house prices (qdatal,t ), real per capita investment (Idatat ),
real per capita output (Y datat ), corporate debt (Bdatat ), unemployment rate (Udatat )
and job separation rate (ρdatat ). The series are defined as follows:
qdatal,t =
Nationwide
cpi
Idatat =
inv
popindex
Y datat =
output
popindex
Bdatat =
Bcorp/cpi
popindex
Udatat = Unemprate
ρdatat = jspissarides
Nationwide: Seasonally adjusted house price index of all houses, derived from
Nationwide lending data for properties at the post survey approval stage
(source: http://www.nationwide.co.uk/about/house-price-index/headlines).
cpi: Consumer price index - all item index. Quarterly averages of the monthly
series are computed. Seasonal adjustment is done via the X12 method. (source:
ONS; code: D7BT.Q).
popindex : The population index is based on the working age (16+) population
measure after normalising the 1985Q1 value to be 1. (source: LFS and ONS;
code: MGSL.Q).
inv: Seasonally adjusted Total Gross Fixed Capital Formation at constant
prices (source: ONS; code: NPQT.Q).
output: Seasonally adjusted Gross Domestic Product chained volume mea-
sures at constant prices (source: ONS; code: ABMI.Q).
Bcorp: Quarterly amounts outstanding of monetary financial institutions’
(MFI) sterling net lending to private non-financial corporations (in sterling mil-
lions) seasonally adjusted. Lending is a sum of UK MFI loans plus UK MFI
holdings of securities. Lending data are derived from the BE return submitted
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by monetary financial institutions (MFIs). The definition of loans includes over-
drafts, loans, reverse repos and short term papers. The definition of holding of
securities is the sum of quoted shares, unquoted shares, bonds and other debt
securities, and other securities, which are issued by the private sector and held
by MFIs for their own beneficial purposes. Securitisations and loan transfers
within M4 lending, unless between MFIs (SPVs are not MFIs), reduce the stock
of lending outstanding, and the monthly change in amount outstanding, the flow,
by the amount of loans securitised. Private non-financial corporations (PNFCs)
are companies that produce goods and/or provide non-financial services. They
are mainly public limited companies, private companies and partnerships where
these are distinct from their owners and not owned by government. (source:
Bank of England Interactive Database, code: LPQBC57, further information:
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/iadb/notesiadb/m4_sectoral.aspx#defs).
Unemprate: LFS unemployment rate in the working age (16+) population
(source: ONS; code: MGSX.Q).
jspissarides: quarterly job separation rates are constructed as described in
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008): during month t, the continuous-time transition
rate from unemployment to employment is ft and that from employment to
unemployment is ρt. The total unemployment outflow during t, denoted by Ft
is given by:
Ft = [1− exp (−ft)]Ut +
1ˆ
0
[1− exp (−ft (1− τ))]St+τdτ, (A.1)
where τ is the the time elapsed since the beginning of the current month, Ut is
unemployment at the start of the period and St+τ is the unemployment inflow
at t+ τ . Assuming that the unemployment inflow is uniform during the month,
equation A.1 approximates to:
Ft = [1− exp (−ft)]Ut +
(
1− 1− exp (−ft)
ft
)
St, (A.2)
where St is the total inflow during the month. Equation A.2 is solved for ft using
available data for Ft, Ut and St. Similarly, the unemployment inflow rate ρt is
obtained from:
St = [1− exp (−ρt)]Nt +
(
1− 1− exp (−ρt)
ρt
)
Ft. (A.3)
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To get quarterly rates, I average over the monthly values.
Additional variables for the VAR estimation Bhh: Quarterly amounts
outstanding of monetary financial institutions’ sterling net lending to household
sector (in sterling millions) seasonally adjusted. The household sector is the
sum of unincorporated businesses, individuals and non-profit institutions serving
households. (source: Bank of England Interactive Database, code: LPQBC44).
hours: LFS total actual weekly hours worked (source: ONS; code: YBUS.Q).
Consumption as an observable As a robustness check, the model is re-
estimated after replacing the investment series with consumption as an observ-
able. The results are presented in section Subsection G.2 below. Consumption
Cdatat is constructed as follows:
Cdatat = conshh+consnpishpopindex , where
conshh: Seasonally adjusted Household Final Consumption Expenditure at
constant prices (source: ONS; code: ABJR.Q). The item covers traditional con-
sumer spending on goods and services. However, national accounting concepts
require the inclusion of income in kind, imputed rent for owner-occupied housing
services and the consumption of own production. Note that the item does not
include the purchase of dwellings or expenditure on valuables, which are part of
capital formation, nor does it include any expenditure on goods or services for
use in a business.
consnpish: Seasonally adjusted Final Consumption Expenditure of Non-profit
Institutions Serving Households at constant prices (source: ONS; code: HAYO.Q).
This sector includes mainly charities, trade unions, religious organisations, po-
litical parties and the majority of universities.
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Figure 12: House Prices, Corporate Credit and the Unemployment Rate in the
Recent UK Recession
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Note: The series for commercial and residential house prices and corporate credit are in nominal terms,
normalised to take value one in 2007Q1 (left axis). The unemployment rate is in % points (right axis).
B Figures
Figure 14: Level of UK House Prices and Unemployment
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Note: House price data are from Nationwide and deflated by CPI; Unemployment data are from ONS. Real
house prices are in logs. The data runs from 1971 to 2013.
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Figure 13: HP-filtered UK House Prices and Unemployment
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Note: House price data are from Nationwide and deflated by CPI; Unemployment data are from ONS. The
data runs from 1972Q1 to 2013Q3. The logarithm of both series are HP-filtered with smoothing parameter,
λ = 1600.
Figure 16: HP-filtered UK House Prices and Job Finding Rates
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Note: House price data are from Nationwide; data on separation rates are from Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2008). The updated data runs from 1985Q1 to 2013Q2. The logarithm of both series are HP-filtered with
smoothing parameter, λ = 1600.
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Figure 15: HP-filtered UK House Prices and the Vacancy-Unemployment Ratio
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Note: House price data are from Nationwide; unemployment data are from ONS and vacancy rate is from the
Bank of England. The data runs from 1980Q1 to 2013Q3. The logarithm of both series are HP-filtered with
smoothing parameter, λ = 1600.
Figure 17: UK Beveridge Curve
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Figure 18: Regional House Prices and Economic Activity
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Note: Data on the value of construction output includes new housing and related work as well as all repair
and maintenance (source: Construction Output survey, ONS). Lending is proxied by the value of new loans
to home-owners for house purchase (source: Survey of Mortgage Lenders prior to 2005, and CML Regulated
Mortgage Survey post 2005). Data on VAT-registrations are the benchmark indicators for the level of en-
trepreneurship (source: Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform prior to 2007, and the
Business Demography Survey for 2008-2013). Migration inflow is measured as international flows of migrants
into the UK from EU and other countries (source: International Passenger Survey, ONS). Investment is proxied
by fixed gross capital formation estimates of the ONS (source: 2014 Quarterly Survey of Capital Expenditure,
ONS). Income is measured as the median gross wage of full-time male workers (source: Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings (1997-2011) and the New Earnings Survey (1985-1996)). All but VAT and migration data are
deflated by CPI.
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Figure 19: Regional House Prices and Labour Markets
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Note: Data on regional unemployment rates are calculated for people aged 16 and above (Source: Labour
Force Survey for 1993-2013 and Regional Trends publications for 1985-1993, ONS). Inflow into unemployment
is measured as the number of new claimants seeking Jobseeker’s Allowance (source: claimant count, ONS). Job
finding rates and job separation rates are calculated as in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) (source: Labour
Force Survey and claimant count, ONS).
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Figure 20: Regional House Prices and Regulatory Housing Constraints
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Note: Data on planning applications are from the Department for Communities and Local Government. The
local authority level data are aggregated up to regional level.
C Results from a Regional Panel
To provide further evidence, regional panel data are used to quantify the impact
of house prices on labour markets. The panel covers the period 1985-2013 and
uses annual data on the 9 English regions.28 Specifically, for region i, at time t
labour market variables are determined according to the following reduced-form
regression:
lit = αi + µt + β · log (hpit) + γ · controlsit + εit, (C.1)
where l = {unemployment rate, log of separation rate, log of job finding rate}
are the labour market variables, αi is a time-invariant, region-specific fixed ef-
fect, δt is a time-variant fixed effect common across regions, thereby capturing
macroeconomic fluctuations in house prices from which the microeconometric
model aims to abstract. The control variables include earnings measured by
the total weekly gross mean earnings for full-time male workers. Regional data
on median gross wages of full-time male workers are obtained from the Annual
Survey of Hours and Earnings (1997-2011) and the New Earnings Survey (1985-
1996). Migration measured as the difference between the inflow and the outflow
of migrants from the EU and other countries.29
Because of potential sources of endogeneity, I build on Mian and Sufi (2011),
28The regions are: North East, North West, Yorkshire and The Humber, East Midlands,
West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South West.
29Data on migration are from the International Passenger Survey (ONS).
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Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) and Hilber and Vermeulen (2015) by instru-
menting regional house prices by constraints on housing supply. I use measures of
regional regulatory constraints, proxied by the rejection rate of planning applica-
tions for all developments. Data on planning application and decision statistics
are available at the local planning authority (LPAs) level since 1979 from the
Department for Communities and Local Government. At each quarter, LPAs are
required to fill in two forms: The PS1 form provides high-level information about
the number of planning and related applications on hand at the beginning of the
quarter, received, withdrawn, called in or turned away during the quarter; the
PS2 form provides more detailed information about the decisions made during
the quarter, broken down by (i) development type; (ii) whether permission was
granted or refused and (iii) the time elapsed from application to decision. As
in Hilber and Vermeulen (2015), I use the PS2 form to measure the number of
applications rejected relative to the number of received applications in a given
year. I aggregate the LPA level data to get regional measures of rejection rates
for the 9 English regions.
If housing supply is restricted by strict planning rules captured by higher
rejection rates, then this will translate into higher prices rather than more real
estate developments. If on the other hand regional planning authorities accept
a higher fraction of planning applications, then this will translate into more
construction and muted volatility in prices. In line with this reasoning, I estimate
the following regression in the first-stage of the 2SLS procedure:
log (hpit) = ai + bt + δ · log (rejectit) + ψ · controlsit + uit, (C.2)
where rejectit is the regional rejection rejection rate of planning permissions,
ai is a regional-specific time-invariant fixed effect and bt denotes a time-variant
fixed effects common to all regions. Figure 20 of this Appendix provides a picto-
rial illustration of the strength of the instrument, indicating the strong positive
relationship between the annual growth rate of rejection rates of planning appli-
cations and the annual growth rate of house prices for the 9 English regions for
the 1985-2011 period.
Table 4 reports estimates of various model specifications of equation C.1.
Three estimators are considered: (i) the first-difference (FD) estimator that is
consistent when the regional effects are fixed, (ii) the fixed effect estimator (FE)
that is more efficient than the FD if the idiosyncratic error uit is iid, and (iii) the
50
Table 4: House Prices and Labour Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FD FE FE FE FE-IV
Unemployment Rate
House Prices -0.018∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.027)
Earnings 0.212∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.059) (0.039)
Migration -0.015 -0.044
(0.078) (0.055)
N 252 261 261 261 243
R2 0.876 0.873 0.909 0.909 0.908
Separation Rate
House Prices -0.374∗∗∗ -0.770∗∗ -0.897∗∗∗ -0.902∗∗∗ -0.996∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.234) (0.196) (0.195) (0.332)
Earnings 0.979 0.941 1.148
(0.749) (0.661) (0.794)
Migration 0.370 0.426
(0.896) (0.592)
N 162 171 171 171 171
R2 0.887 0.939 0.941 0.941 0.941
Job Finding Rate
House Prices -0.032 0.169∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.161
(0.066) (0.052) (0.074) (0.067) (0.205)
Earnings -0.478 -0.273 -0.064
(0.446) (0.600) (0.466)
Migration -1.973∗ -1.918∗∗∗
(0.915) (0.612)
N 162 171 171 171 171
R2 0.873 0.968 0.969 0.973 0.973
Year fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variables are the unemployment rate (upper panel), job separation
rates (middle panel) and job finding rates (lower panel). All models control for time fixed
and region fixed effects. Column 1 is the first-difference panel model. Columns 2, 3 and 4 are
fixed effects panel models. Column 5 shows results from Panel-IV models where rejection
rates of planning applications are used as instruments for house prices. Data on separation
and job finding rates start in 1993, and data on rejection rates end in 2011.
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panel instrumental variable (FE-IV) estimator adapted to equations C.1–C.2 as
implemented by Schaffer (2005).
As shown by Table 4 the effect of a 1% increase in real house prices on the
unemployment rate is significantly negative in all model specifications. This
effect is estimated to be the smallest by the FD model (−0.02%) and largest by
FE-IV (−0.075%) models. The effect on separation rates is significantly positive
in all model speficifications. The estimated impact of a 1% increase in house
prices ranges between −0.4% and −1% across the five models. The impact on
job finding rates is substantially smaller and less statistically significant with the
estimates ranging between zero and 0.3%. Overall, the results are consistent with
the strong unconditional comovements between house prices and unemployment
and job separation rates, shown by Figures 13–1.
The collateral channel that will take center stage in the theoretical model
developed in Section 3 could provide a possible explanation for the estimation
results. Higher house prices increase collateral values fueling more borrowing in
both the household and corporate sectors, leading to increased economic activity.
To provide further illustrative evidence on this channel, I modify the regression
model C.1 to estimate the impact of house prices on (i) bank lending and (ii) on
firm creation.
Given that data on lending to corporates are not readily available at regional
level, I proxy bank lending by the total value of new mortgage lending for house
purchases. Firm creation is proxied by the total number of VAT registration in a
given region for all industries. Data on the total value of mortgage loans (loans to
home-owners for house purchase) is from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders (prior
to 2005) and from the CML Regulated Mortgage Survey (after 2005). Data
on regional VAT-registrations are from the ONS and the Business Demography
Survey. Table 5 presents the estimation results, suggesting that house prices
have a statistically and economically significant effect on new firm creation and
bank lending.
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Table 5: House Prices, Lending and Firm Creation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FD FE FE FE FE-IV
VAT Registrations (Firm Birth)
House Prices 0.153∗∗ 0.240∗ 0.163∗ 0.163∗ 0.598∗∗
(0.049) (0.126) (0.078) (0.079) (0.244)
Earnings 1.122∗∗ 1.127∗∗ 0.552∗
(0.375) (0.480) (0.310)
Migration -0.049 0.131
(1.130) (0.578)
R2 0.907 0.852 0.875 0.875 0.820
Mortgage Lending
House Prices 0.337∗ 0.452∗ 0.289∗∗ 0.289∗∗ 0.714∗∗
(0.172) (0.200) (0.106) (0.104) (0.326)
Earnings 2.385∗∗ 2.278∗∗ 1.783∗∗∗
(0.957) (0.958) (0.474)
Migration 1.112 1.076
(0.639) (0.791)
R2 0.851 0.944 0.957 0.958 0.955
Year fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 252 261 261 261 243
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table reports the empirical link between house prices and labour market
variables. The dependent variables are the number of VAT registrations (upper panel) and
total value of mortgage lending (lower panel). All models control for time-variant fixed effects
and region-specific time-invariant fixed effects. Column 1 is the first-difference panel model.
Columns 2, 3 and 4 are fixed effects panel models. Column 5 shows results from Panel-IV
models where rejection rates of planning applications are used as instruments for house
prices.
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D Stationary Equilibrium
I follow Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) in transforming the trending variables into
their stationary counterparts:
Y˜t ≡ YtΓt , C˜h,t ≡
Ch,t
Γt
, C˜e,t ≡ Ce,tΓt , I˜t ≡
It
QtΓt
, K˜t ≡ Kt
QtΓt
, B˜t ≡ BtΓt ,
W˜t ≡ WtΓt , λ˜h,t ≡
λh,t
Γt
, λ˜e,t ≡ λe,tΓt , µ˜e,t ≡
µe,t
Γt
, q˜l,t ≡ ql,tΓt , q˜k,t ≡ qk,tQt,
where the trending factor is defined as:
Γt ≡
[
ZtQ
(1−φ)α
t
] 1
1−(1−φ)α . (D.1)
The stationary equilibrium is characterised by the following system:
D.1 Household
λ˜h,t =
1
C˜h,t − hhC˜h,t−1Γt−1/Γt
− Et βhhh
C˜h,t+1Γt+1/Γt − hhC˜h,t
1
Rt
= βhEt
λ˜h,t+1
λ˜h,t
Γt
Γt+1
q˜l,t = βhEt
λ˜h,t+1
λ˜h,t
q˜l,t+1 +
ϕt
λ˜h,tLh,t
.
(D.2)
D.2 Entrepreneur
λ˜e,t =
1
C˜e,t − heC˜e,t−1gt
− Et βhe
C˜e,t+1gt+1 − heC˜e,t
1
Rt
= βEtΛ˜et,t+1
Γt
Γt+1
+ µ˜e,t
λ˜e,t
1 = q˜k,t
1− Ω2
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
QtΓt
Qt−1Γt−1
− λ¯I
)2
− Ω
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
QtΓt
Qt−1Γt−1
− λ¯I
)
I˜t
I˜t−1
QtΓt
Qt−1Γt−1

+ EtΛ˜et,t+1
QtΓt
Qt+1Γt+1
q˜k,t+1
(
I˜t+1
I˜t
Qt+1Γt+1
QtΓt
− λ¯I
)(
I˜t+1
I˜t
Qt+1Γt+1
QtΓt
)2
q˜k,t = EtΛ˜et,t+1
[
α (1− φ) Y˜t
K˜t
+ q˜k,t
QtΓt
Qt+1Γt+1
(1− δ)
]
+ µ˜e,t
λ˜e,t
Etθe,tq˜k,t+1
Qt
Qt+1
q˜l,t = EtΛ˜et,t+1
[
αφ
Y˜t
Le,t
+ q˜l,t+1
]
+ µ˜e,t
λ˜e,t
Etθtq˜l,t+1
Γt+1
Γt
.
(D.3)
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D.3 Labour Markets
mt = ψtuωt v1−ωt
qut =
mt
ut
qvt =
mt
vt
Θt =
qut
qvt
= vt
ut
Nt = (1− ρt)Nt−1 +mt
ut = 1− (1− ρt)Nt−1
κ
qvt
= EtΛ˜et,t+1 (1− ρt+1)
[
(1− α) Y˜t+1
Nt+1
− W˜t+1ht+1 + κ
qvt+1
]
W˜tht = ξt (p˜it + κΘt) + (1− ξt)
χh
1+ν
t
1+ν +
´ a¯t
0 at
dF (at+1)
F (a¯t+1)
λ˜h,t
+ b

p˜it =
g (ht, a¯t)
λ˜h,t
+ b− 1− ξt+1q
u
t
1− ξt+1
κ
qvt
ρt = 1− F (a¯t)
Ut = 1−Nt
χ
hνt
λ˜h,t
= (1− α) Y˜t
Ntht
.
(D.4)
D.4 The Rest of the Model
Y˜t =
(
ZtQt
Zt−1Qt−1
)− (1−φ)α1−(1−φ)α [
K˜1−φt−1 L
φ
e,t−1
]α
(htNt)1−α
Y˜t = C˜h,t + C˜e,t + I˜t + κvt
L¯ = Lh,t + Le,t
B˜t = θtEt
[
q˜l,t+1Le,t
Γt+1
Γt
+ q˜k,t+1Kt
Qt
Qt+1
]
.
(D.5)
E Steady-state
E.1 Consumers
The steady-state interest rate and shadow prices are:
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1
R
= βh
gγ
µ˜e
λ˜e
= βh − β
gγ
.
(E.1)
The marginal utility of consumption of the two agents:
λ˜h =
1
C˜h
[
gγ − βhhh
gγ − hh
]
λ˜e =
1
C˜e
[
gγ − βhe
gγ − he
]
.
(E.2)
To get the ratio of commercial land to output, use the entrepreneurial land
Euler-equation and the definition E.1:
q˜lLe
Y˜
= αφβ1− β − (βh − β) θ . (E.3)
So the parameter φ is given by:
φ =
q˜lLe
Y˜
[1− β − (βh − β) θ]
αβ
, (E.4)
whereas the scale parameter α is given by capital demand:
α =
1− µ˜e
λ˜e
θ
β/gγ
− (1− δ)
gγ (1− φ)
K˜
Y˜
. (E.5)
Given the target values for the steady-state K˜
Y˜
and q˜lLe
Y˜
, equations E.4–E.5 pin
down φ and α. The steady-state investment-output ratio can be matched by
choosing the appropriate value for δ:
I˜
K˜
= 1− 1− δ
λk
.
Using the definition of the return on capital, the steady-state capital-output ratio
is:
K˜
Y˜
= gγα (1− φ)
Rke
.
The investment-output ratio is:
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I˜Y˜
= I˜
K˜
K˜
Y˜
=
[
1− 1
λk
((βh − β) θ + β (1− δ))
]−1
βα (1− φ) . (E.6)
The binding entrepreneurial credit-constraint implies:
B˜
Y˜
= θ
[
g
q˜lLe
Y˜
+ K˜
λ¯qY˜
]
. (E.7)
Using the definition of the return on entrepreneurial land (Rl = αφY/Lc), the
entrepreneurial flow-of-funds constraint implies:
C˜e
Y˜
= Rk
K˜
Y˜
+ αφ− I˜
Y˜
−
[
1
g
− 1
R
]
B˜
Y˜
. (E.8)
The aggregate resource constraint implies:
C˜h
Y˜
= 1− C˜e
Y˜
− I˜
Y˜
− κv
Y˜
. (E.9)
To solve for Lh
Le
, use the steady-state land demand ratios E.3:
Lh
Le
= ϕL (gγ − hh) (1− β − (βh − β) θ)
αφβθ (1− gγ/R) (1− hh/R)
C˜h
Y˜
. (E.10)
Given the steady-state of the average unemployment rate U , employment is:
N = 1− U. (E.11)
The matching function:
m = ρN. (E.12)
Endogenous separation rate:
ρn = ρ− ρ
x
1− ρx . (E.13)
The threshold value of the idiosyncratic preference shock:
a¯ = F−1 (1− ρn) . (E.14)
The number of searching workers:
u = 1− (1− ρ)N. (E.15)
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The job finding rate is:
qu = m
u
. (E.16)
Using the matching function, the number of vacancies:
v =
(
m
ψuω
) 1
1−ω
. (E.17)
The vacancy filling rate:
qv = m
v
. (E.18)
To derive steady-states levels, use the condition for labour hours:
χhν
λ˜h
= (1− α) Y˜
Nh
.
Using the definition of the shadow price, 1
λ˜h
= Y˜
[
C˜h
Y˜
] (
gγ−hh
gγ−βhh(1+λa)
)
, and setting
labour hours h = 1/4 in steady state, the labour scale parameter is given:
χ =
(1− α) 1
N
h1+ν
[
C˜h
Y˜
] (
g−hh
g−βhh(1+λa)
) .
Using the production function:
Y˜ 1−(1−φ)α = (hN)1−α
[(
K˜/
(
Y˜ gγ
))1−φ
(Le)φ
]α
. (E.19)
Given the level of output E.19, investment, capital and consumption are deter-
mined by the ratios derived above. To obtain a solution for wages, operate on
the following labour market conditions:
κ
qv
=
β (1− ρ)
[
(1− α) Y˜
N
− W˜h
]
1− β (1− ρ) (E.20)
a¯
λ˜h
= ν1 + ν (1− α)
Y˜
N
− b+ 1− ξ¯q
u
1− ξ¯
κ
qv
(E.21)
W˜h = ξ¯
(
(1− α) Y˜
N
+ κΘ
)
+
(
1− ξ¯
)((1− α
1 + ν
)
Y˜
N
+ H (a¯)
λ˜h
+ b
)
, (E.22)
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where E.20 is vacancy posting equation, E.21 determines the threshold a¯, and
E.22 is the steady-state wage equation. Some useful derivatives for the distri-
bution of the idiosyncratic preference shock are as follows. The steady-state of
the conditional expectation of a given a¯ can be written using the formula for the
partial expectation of the log-normal distribution:
H (a¯) ≡
ˆ a¯
0
a
dF (a)
F (a¯) =
1
F (a¯) exp
(
µa +
1
2σ
2
a
)
Φ
(
ln (a¯)− µa − σ2a
σa
)
. (E.23)
where Φ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. The semi-elasticity of
the conditional expectation with respect to a¯ is given by the Leibniz rule:
∂H (a¯)
∂a¯
a¯ =
ˆ a¯
0
∂
(
adF (a)
F (a¯)
)
∂a¯
+ a¯ f (a¯)
F (a¯)
 a¯ = [ˆ a¯
0
−adF (a)F (a¯)−2 f (a¯) + a¯ f (a¯)
F (a¯)
]
a¯
=
[
− f (a¯)
F (a¯)H (a¯) + a¯
f (a¯)
F (a¯)
]
a¯ = a¯f (a¯)
F (a¯) [a¯−H (a¯)]
(E.24)
Substituting E.20 and E.21 into E.22 and simplifying yields:
W˜h = (1− α) Y˜
N
− (1− β (1− ρ))
(
1− ξ¯
)( a¯−H (a¯)
λ˜h
)
(E.25)
Further complication is that the real wage W˜ in E.25 depends on the shadow
price λ˜h which needs to be expressed. To do so, I use E.2 together with the
steady-state of the household’s budget constraint 3.4 to write:
1
λ˜h
=
[
W˜hN +
(
1− 1
R
)
B˜
]
gγ − hh
gγ − βhhh , (E.26)
which is substituted into E.25 to yield (after some rearranging) the steady-state
solution for the real wage:
W˜h =
(1−α)
1−β(1−ρ)
Y˜
N
−
(
1− ξ¯
) (
[a¯−H (a¯)]
(
1− 1
R
)
B˜ς
)
1
1−β(1−ρ) +
(
1− ξ¯
)
[a¯−H (a¯)]Nς . (E.27)
where ς ≡ (gγ − hh) / (gγ − βhhh). Given the level of wages E.27, the vacancy
posting condition E.20 is used to pin down the cost parameter κ. Substituting
into E.21 pins down the unemployment benefit parameter b.
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F The Log-linearised System
Given the steady-states and the defined constants Ωh ≡ (gγ − βhhh) (gγ − hh)
and Ωe ≡ (gγ − βhe) (gγ − he), the log-linearised first-order conditions are:
Ωˆhλˆh = −
[
g2γ + hhβh
]
Cˆh,t + gγhh
(
Cˆh,t−1 − gˆγ,t
)
+ βhgγhhEt
(
Cˆh,t+1 + gˆγ,t+1
)
Ωˆeλˆe = −
[
g2γ + heβ
]
Cˆe,t + gγhe
(
Cˆe,t−1 − gˆγ,t
)
+ βgγheEt
(
Cˆe,t+1 + gˆγ,t+1
)
λˆh,t − Rˆt = βhEt
[
λˆh,t+1 + qˆl,t+1
]
+ [1− βh]
(
ϕˆt − Lˆi,t
)
λˆe,t − Rˆt = β
βh
[
Et
(
λˆe,t+1 − gˆγ,t+1
)
+ βh − β
β
µˆe,t
]
qˆl,t + λˆe,t =
µ˜e
λ˜e
gγθ
(
µˆe,t + θˆt
)
+
(
1− µ˜e
λ˜e
gγθ
)
Etλˆe,t+1 +
µ˜e
λ˜e
gγθEt (qˆl,t+1 + gˆγ,t+1)
+ βEtqˆl,t+1 + (1− β − (βh − β) θ)Et
[
Yˆt+1 − Lˆe,t
]
qˆk,t + λˆe,t =
µ˜e
λ˜e
θ
λ¯q
(
µˆe,t + θˆt
)
+ β (1− δ)
λk
Et (qˆk,t+1 − gˆq,t+1 − gˆγ,t+1) +
(
1− µ˜e
λ˜e
θ
λ¯q
)
Etλˆe,t+1
+ µ˜e
λ˜e
θ
λ¯q
Et (qˆk,t+1 − gˆγ,t+1) + βα (1− κ) Y˜
K˜
Et
(
Yˆt+1 − Kˆt
)
qˆk,t = Ωλ2k
[
(1 + β) Iˆt − Iˆt−1
]
+ Ωλ2k (qˆq,t + gˆγ,t)− βΩλ2kEt
[
Iˆt+1 + qˆq,t+1 + gˆγ,t+1
]
mˆt = ψˆt + ωuˆt + (1− ω) vˆt
qˆut = mˆt − uˆt
qˆvt = mˆt − vˆt
Θˆt = vˆt − uˆt
Nˆt = (1− ρ) Nˆt−1 − ρρˆt + ρmˆt
uˆt =
− (1− ρ)NNˆt−1 + ρNρˆt
1− (1− ρ)N
ρˆt =
(1− ρx) ρnρˆnt
ρ
ρˆnt =
−f (a¯) a¯
1− F (a¯)
ˆ¯at
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− κ
qv
qˆvt = β (1− ρ)
[
(1− α) Y˜
N
(
Yˆt+1 − Nˆt+1
)
− W˜h
(
Wˆt+1 + hˆt+1
)
− κ
qv
(
qˆvt+1
)]
+ β
(
(1− α) Y˜
N
− W˜h+ κ
qv
) [
(1− ρ)
(
λˆe,t+1 − λˆe,t
)
− ρρˆt+1
]
νhˆt = λˆh,t + Yˆt − Nˆt − hˆt
Uˆt = − N1−N Nˆt
The log-linearised zero surplus condition:
a¯
λ˜h
(
ˆ¯at − λˆh,t
)
= ν1 + ν (1− α)
Y˜
N
(
Yˆt − Nˆt
)
+ 1− ξq
u
1− ξ
κ
qv
(
ξ
1− ξ ξˆt+1 −
(
ξqu
1− ξqu
)(
ξˆt+1 + qˆut
)
− qˆvt
)
where I used the fact g (ht, a¯t) = χh
1+ν
t
1+ν + a¯t =
1−α
1+ν
Y˜t
Nt
λ˜h,t + a¯t. The log-linearised
wage equation:
W˜h
(
Wˆt + hˆt
)
=ξ (1− α) Y˜
N
(
ξˆt + Yˆt − Nˆt
)
+ ξκΘ
(
ξˆt + qˆut − qˆvt
)
+ (1− ξ)χ h
1+ν
λh (1 + ν)
(
(1 + ν) hˆt − λˆh,t
)
+ 1− ξ
λ˜h
(
∂H (a¯)
∂a¯
a¯ˆ¯at − λˆh,t
)
− ξ
χ h1+ν(1+ν) +H (a¯)
λ˜h
+ b
 ξˆt
The log-linearised equations for the rest of the model:
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Yˆt = αφLˆe,t−1 + α (1− φ) Kˆt−1 + (1− α)
(
Nˆt + hˆt
)
− (1− φ)α1− (1− φ)α [gˆz,t + gˆq,t]
Kˆt =
1− δ
λk
[
Kˆt−1 − gˆγ,t − gˆq,t
]
+
(
1− 1− δ
λk
)
Iˆt
Yˆt =
C˜h
Y˜
Cˆh,t +
C˜e
Y˜
Cˆe,t +
I˜
Y˜
Iˆt +
κv
Y˜
vˆt
0 = Lh
L¯
Lˆh,t +
Le
L¯
Lˆe,t
αYˆt =
C˜e
Y˜
Cˆe,t +
I˜
Y˜
Iˆt +
q˜lLe
Y˜
(
Lˆe,t − L˜e,t−1
)
+ 1
gγ
B˜
Y˜
(
Bˆt−1 − gˆγ,t
)
− 1
R
B˜
Y˜
(
Bˆt − Rˆt
)
Bˆt = θˆt + gγθ
q˜lLe
B˜
Et
(
qˆl,t+1 + Lˆe,t + gˆγ,t+1
)
+
(
1− gγθ q˜lLe
B˜
)
Et
(
qˆk,t+1 + Kˆt − gˆq,t+1
)
The terms gˆz,t, gˆq,t and gˆγ,t are given by:
gˆz,t = λˆz,t + νˆz,t − νˆz,t−1
gˆq,t = λˆq,t + νˆq,t − νˆq,t−1
gˆγ,t =
1
1− (1− φ)αgˆz,t +
(1− φ)α
1− (1− φ)αgˆq,t
The technology shocks follow the processes:
λˆz,t = ρzλˆz,t−1 + εˆz,t
λˆq,t = ρqλˆq,t−1 + εˆq,t
νˆz,t = ρνz νˆz,t−1 + εˆνz ,t
νˆq,t = ρνq νˆq,t−1 + εˆνq ,t
The other shocks follow the processes:
ϕˆt = ρϕϕˆt−1 + εˆϕ,t
ψˆt = ρψψˆt−1 + εˆψ,t
θˆt = ρθθˆt−1 + εˆθ,t
ξˆt = ρξ ξˆt−1 + εˆξ,t
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G Additional Tables and Figures
G.1 Baseline Estimation
Figure 21: Comparing the Housing Shock to the Investment Specific Shock in
the DSGE model
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Note: The black circled (red crossed) lines represent the IRFs to a one standard deviation housing shock
(permanent investment specific shock) in the DSGE model using the estimated posterior modes of the
parameters.
Figure 22: FEVD: The Importance of Housing Shocks in the DSGE and BVAR
models
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Note: The figure shows the FEVD results for the housing shock up to a 20-quarter horizon. The blue lines are
from the DSGE model using the estimated modes. The black lines and shaded areas (10th-90th percentiles)
are the results from the BVAR(2), which is estimated in the levels of the six observables used in the DSGE
model. The identification of the housing shock in the BVAR model is based on Choleski orthogonalisation with
real house price ordered as the first variable. The priors in the BVAR are set following Banbura, Giannone,
and Reichlin (2010), using relatively loose priors, captured by the hyper parameter λ = 1.
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Figure 23: Vacancy-Unemployment Ratio: the Lack of Explanatory Power of
Technology Shocks
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Note: The modes of the estimated parameters are used to compute the % deviation of the ratio of the vacancy
rate and the unemployment rate (magenta solid line) and the contribution of the permanent and transitory
components of the TFP shock to this series (blue diamond and red circles lines) in the DSGE model. The
off-model estimate (black dashed line) is constructed by demeaning and linearly detrending the logarithm of
the ratio of the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate, where vacancy data are from the ONS’s Vacancy
Survey and Job Centres records.
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G.2 Using Consumption as Observable
This subsection presents additional robustness check on the estimation results.
Per capita investment is replaced with per capital consumption as the sixth
observable in the Bayesian estimation of the DSGE model.
Figure 24: The Impact of Housing Shocks in the DSGE model
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Note: The black lines represent the IRFs to a housing shock in the DSGE model using the estimated posterior
modes of the parameters. The IRFs are normalised to give a 1% increase in house prices.
Figure 25: FEVD: The Importance of Housing Shocks in the DSGE and BVAR
models
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Note: The figure shows the FEVD results for the housing shock up to a 20-quarter horizon. The blue lines are
from the DSGE model using the estimated modes. The black lines and shaded areas (10th-90th percentiles)
are the results from the BVAR(2), which is estimated in the levels of the six observables used in the DSGE
model. The identification of the housing shock in the BVAR model is based on Choleski orthogonalisation with
real house price ordered as the first variable. The priors in the BVAR are set following Banbura, Giannone,
and Reichlin (2010), using relatively loose priors, captured by the hyper parameter λ = 1.
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